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INTRODUCTION 
The term 'worker participation' is popular currency within public, 
business and governmental circles at the present time. One might infer 
from the manner in which it is being hailed , in some countries, as a sort 
of industrial philosopher's stone, that the idea is a new one. However, even 
the most cursory examination of the literature will reveal that this is not 
the case. Worker participation is an idea which surfaced on many previous 
occasions, only to sink once again into relative obscurity. Perhaps the 
most recent strong manifestation of interest, prior to the present revival, 
is to be found in the ideas of the Guild Socialists.' Although there was 
something of a decline in the popularity of this philosophy after the 1920s, 
developments have continued apace in some countries until the present 
day. Nevertheless, in recent times there has been yet another upsurge in 
interest and publicity, curiously enough particularly amongst management. 
I use the term 'curiously' since one of the features of previous exponents 
of worker participation has been their classification amongst the ranks of 
the more left-wing elements of society, hardly a label to be used for most 
modern managements. How then are we to account for this upsurge of 
interest in worker participation? This is the question to which this paper 
will be addressed. 
The purpose of the paper IS twofold It 
sets out to examine the nature ol worker 
participation, particularly the way in which 
the term might be used by different people 
for different ends. Followmg this initial 
analysis, it will seek to explore the extent 
of worker participation in New Zealand at 
the present time, particularly the forms in 
which 1t is pract1sed. The paper aims to 
shed some light upon the reasons for 
management's current interest 1n worker 
participation. In doing so, ll Will be con-
cerned with whether the term 'worker par-
ticipation' really refers to participation at 
all, or whether In reality it is a manage-
ment strategy for seeking to maintain con-
trol over a workforce increasingly uncom-
mitted to managerial goals. 
PARTICIPATION DEFINED 
It is clearly important at the outset to 
def1ne part1c1pat1on, since this is to form 
the basis for subsequent discussion. Fun-
damental to any d1scuss1on of part1cipat1on 
is the concept of democracy. Democratic 
soc1et1es hold values which are a1med at 
Increasing the freedom of the individual to 
control his own de5tiny, and the establish-
ment of equal rights for members of those 
soc1et1es Democracy is an 1dea which 
soc1et1es seek to attain through their InSti-
tutions These ins~itutlons may be, for 
example, public, governmental, legal or 
business. There are those who argue that 
the establishment of a political democracy 
and the theoretical equality of individua-l 
Citizens 1n determining governmental polic-
ies and dec1sions, needs also to be reflect-
ed in economic or mdustrial democracy 2 
Moreover, 1t does not make sense to est-
ablish oolit1cal democracy and, at the same 
t1me, to leave mdustry under authoritanan 
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rule Those who are employees of the 
An terpnse. rt IS argued. should have an 
equal rrght to the owners of the entcrpnse 
to determ1ne the policies Unlrke the poll-
ileal ystom. where the electorate has a 
orca 1n the electron of the government 
and the government 1s accountable to thP 
electorate. rn the workplace the s1tuatron IS 
dtfferent The bulk of the workforce rs sub-
•ect to managerial decisions and manage-
ment ·~ not accountable to rt Rather, 
workers are SUbJect to a contractual 
relat1onshrp, perhaps exercrsrng con ter-
vaiHng power aga1nst management through 
the trade un1ons 
The term partrcipallon· has been sub-
Jected to a variety of definitions and 
nterpretations, and has come to have a 
~ range of meanings. This, in part. 
mrghr help to explain why the term enjoys 
~o much popularity from so many diverse 
sections of society It our discussion is to 
prove frurtful, 1t is necessary to embark 
uoon a definition at this point. Useful In 
thrs context is that of French et aiJ who 
define participation as 
·a process rn which two or more 
parties influence each other in making 
certarn plans, pollctes and dectsions 
It IS restricted to decisrons that have 
further effects on all those mak1ng 
the dec1sion and on those represented 
by them ' 
such ISSues as hinng and frring, 
promotions and transfers. overtime 
pay .vage rates. hours of work, 
holrdays and training 
2 Social Decisions. Th€se m1ght be 
.1 ted with the admlntstratron 
)f we are programmes. health and 
safety regulations. pens•on funds 
and similar thing 
3 Economic Decisions. These might in 
turn be d1v1ded into: 
(a) Tcchnrct IS"ut. concernmg 
methods of production produc-
lron planning and control. dtvr-
Sion of labour. dcsrgn of jobs, 
and organisational arrange-
ments. and 
(b) 'Busrness rssue~ uch as org-
antsalional Objectives and 
prrorr::es. product lrne... markets 
and sales, expanston or contrac-
tion of operatton rattonallsatton 
capital investment distnbutton 
and use of proflls. changes rn 
plant organisation mergers and 
so on 
These grve orne rdea of the range of 
decrsion-mak1ng areas over wh1ch par1tCI-
patron could conceivably extend Some of 
lhe"e 1 ~ .Jre moro rmmediatelv related 
to the job the rndividual does, others are 
somowhat less rmmedrate. but form the 
framework within whrch the 10b is carried 
out A c'oser examination of the so rt of 
lrsllng outltned above reveals a further 
Crucial to this defmif1on is the process 
of mu tual or joint decision-making between 
two or more parties This clearly excludes 
a situation m whrch one party merely sup-
plies rnformalton to the other which pas-
.3ively rece1ves rt This latter process 
cannot properly be consrdered a process 
of joint dectsron-making or mutual influ-
ence 
haP•'tem rlton f •vpe of parllcrpation. 
The may be t ed ~ower-centre-:! and 
task-centred.' Power-centred parttcrpatton 
Since we are concerned here With wor-
ker partlcipatton or more speCifiCally 
workers' partrctpatron tn the dec sion-
malong of the organ1sat1on. one m1ght also 
question the krnds of decrstons worl.:ers 
mrght be expected to partrctpate tn 
Blumberg4 crtes three categories of man-
agenal decrsion-making rn which workers 
mtght ,eek a role 
1 Personnel Decisions. These cover 
h, "ll r arm · extPn ron o' bargatning 
power ork· w11 n h enterprl and 
3--Fr&nch J A P I ac ld Aas 0 An Expertment In ParUctpatlon In a Norwegian Factory, Human Aetat10n I 1960, p 
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rs dtror'ed ai;C' at makmg manag rial 
dectsiOI"-maker ., ra ac("'ountable to the 
uruc n or dtrecl/y •o he workers Task-
centred partrctpatron emphasises the JOb 
as a ltkely source of s tisfac•ron. an •n· 
crease rn whtch rs ltkely to lead to greater 
producttvlly and better industnal relattons 
thereby f ctlttatrng the aHarnment of 
managpr ly-srr 9<' Is for the org m-;ation 
Each of these ktnd, of parttcrpa• on has 
drfferent arms Power-centred participation 
arms nt parflctpwtron in dec1s1ons which 
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shape the overall pollc1es and goals of the 
enterprise. It might further be concerned 
w1th the questions of who make• declt•ons, 
at what level, and on what issue? Task-
centred participation restricts 1tself to those 
decis1ons relating to the 1mmed1ate ;ob. 
and within the framework of decisions 
already made about goals or policies at 
the higher level The mdividual worker may 
or may not have the desire to participate at 
one or both of these levels. However, one 
thmg remains clear, all decisions made at 
the higher level impact in some form or 
other at the task level The immediate 
effect upon the worker of decisions made 
for a particular level of profit. or for a 
oart1cular product or market all have their 
impact in the constraints they bring to bear 
on subsequent decisions Investment deci-
sions,-for example. may not appear to affect 
workers. until perhaps the plant closure 
plans are announced. Both kinds of 
decision-makmg are closely interwoven. To 
concentrate solely upon the task level begs 
an 1mportant question about the decisions 
made at higher levels which have resulted 
in the kind of work be1ng earned out, the 
kind of technology being used, and the 
amount of discretionary content built Into 
the ;ob itself. 
Clearly, a cruc1al question to consider 
in any discuss1on of worker participation 
is the aim of that participation. Any under-
standing of the different forms of 'partiCi-
pation' which have been put forward, and 
in some cases implemented can only be 
gained by relating them to the underlying 
goals and the ideological standpoint of 
those proposing them. It is to these factors 
that we now turn 
GOALS AND IDEOLOGY 
Those who support forms of part1cipat1on 
might be regarded as falling 1nto two dis-
tinct camps .6 There are those who advocate 
forms of participation which embrace both 
the determination of organisational goals, 
as well as the establishment of means to 
achieve those goals. One might think of 
these as representing a left-wing non-
managerial viewpoint. Equally, there are 
those who restrict the scope of participa-
tion merely to the determination of means. 
with the goals already set by management 
These tend to have what might be con-
•ldered a distinctly managerial perspective 
Obviously, the purpose or goal of partiCipa-
tion will determine not only the type of 
partic1pat1on proposed, but the attitudes 
and expectations of the part1es Involved 
towards it. 
Participation, then, moy take a number 
of forms w1th different goals depending 
upon the beliefs of the chief proponents.7 
At one extreme are those who believe that 
worker participation does not need to mean 
anything more than an improvement in the 
two-way tfow of information and ideas 
between employers and employed, and who 
might advocate methods for 'improving 
communication.' At the other extreme might 
be the advocates of workers' control, who 
argue that regardless of ownership, the 
workers should have a dominant, if not 
the sole, voice in determining the manage-
ment policy ol the organisation in which 
they work 
In order to begin this enquiry into the 
goals of participation, one must consider 
the concept ol ideology. An ideology is the 
system of beliefs or ideas characteristic of 
a particular group As we noted earlier, 11 
Is management who are in the vanguard of 
the most recent developments in partici-
pative approaches. It 1s only fitting, there-
lore, that we begin with an examination ol 
the possible beliefs which management hold 
about participation. Two reasons for this 
interest in participation are worth noting 
at this stage. There are those who view 
democracy in the workplace as an exten-
sion of democracy in the wider society, 
reflectmg a belief in the terminal desira-
bility of worker participation. That is to 
say, participation is a desirable end in 
itself One might, however, see worker 
participation as an instrumental activity, in 
other words, a means of achieving otner 
des,able outcomes. Managements, for 
example, place a high value on profit and 
business ef11ciency as criteria of success. 
Participation may be considered instru-
mental by them insofar as it makes a 
contribution towards the achievement of 
organisational ob;ectives Management's 
v1ew of worker participation may Indeed be 
closely allied to its own goals of higher 
productivity and greater efficiency. Many 
of the discussions favouring participation 
have their foundation in the belief that 
6--Chlld J. The Buslneu Entorprlae In Modem Industrial Society {Colller·Macmitlan Ltd, 1969) p 88 
7-Shull H (ed ). Worker Participation In West Germany, Sweden, Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom, 
OER Special No . 20 1The Er·onomrst Intelligence Untt Lid 1975) p 2 
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partiCipative methods will arouse employees' 
interest and co-operation lead1ng to greater 
productivity and the pursuit of managerially-
defined goals. It may also be seen as a 
way of reducmg conflict so often apparent 
m modern organi!;SIIons by promoting a 
harmony of interests between management 
and the workforcfl 
In seeking to permit greater opportunit-
Ies lor workers to have a say in decisions 
one implies a corresponding reduction in 
the amount of influence and authority m 
decision-making presently exercised by 
management. The casual observer may, at 
first sight, be somewhat puzzled in seeking 
to explain why any move to increase the 
power of the workforce. and lessen the 
prerogative of management. should be 
welcomed by management. Indeed, one 
might almost expect the reverse of this, 
that management would seek to resist or 
at least contain any schemes which might 
challenge managerial authority. How then 
are we to explain management"s pre-
occupatiOn with participation at the present 
t1me? 
VIEWS OF THE ENTERPRISE 
In order to answer this question, one 
needs to examine the range of beliefs 
which management might hold about lhe 
nature of the enterpnse. Two rather con-
trasting views of the enterprise have been 
most clearly expounded by Fox.a These he 
labels the 'unitary· and 'pluralistic' frames 
of referencej The unitary view of the enter-
prise sees members of the enterprise 
striving jointly towards the achievement of 
a common ObjeCtive There IS one locus 
of authority, the manager The closest 
analogy. perhaps IS that of a team . The 
bel1ef in a common purpose and harmony 
of 1nterests denies the validity of conflict 
in the enterpnse. Since conflict over objec-
tives or methods 1s 1mposs1ble, it 1s put 
down to personal Incompatibilities, faulty 
commun1catlons. stupidity on the part of 
the workforce or the work of agitators 
Managements subscribing to the unitary 
v1ew may further hold the v1ew that trade 
unions are unnecessary in the modern 
world where management is the best 
equipped to look after the 1nterests of the 
workforce Indeed, trade unions, 1t Is 
believed, ach1eve nothing for their mem-
bers which would not be forthcoming 1n 
any case 
"). In contrast to the unitary frame of 
reference, the pluralistic view sees the 
enterprise as consisting of many separate 
interests and obrectives. The degree of 
common purpose- -which exists may be 
rather limited, and sectional groups go 
about pursuing the~r own interests In 
different ways. Because of these differing 
Interests, conflict is endemic to most 
organisations Further to this. far from 
introducing conflict into the organisation, 
trade unions merely act as a vehicle for 
tne expression of such conflict as would 
exist in any case. The trade union. apart 
from Its protective function, may seek to 
place curbs on managerial prerogative by 
its involvement in decision-making on behalf 
of its membershi~ These decisions may 
include rates of pay, the use of managerial 
authority, or many other decisions in which 
managements engage. It is a matter of 
practical significance that workers, through 
the process of belonging to representative 
organisations, such as trade unions, have 
sought to influence. and where possible. 
control the process of management 
dec1sion-mak1ng It is intereslng to note, 
therefore, that when managements speak 
of worker participation, they speak not of 
enlarging the role of the trade union as a 
means of extending the degree of partici-
pation afforded to the workforce In 
decision-making Rather. managements 
have turned to other vehicles for worker 
participation which rely, for the most part, 
on methods other than trade union Involve-
ment 
PARTICIPATION AND IDEOLOGY 
Management"s frame of reference 1s 
likely to influence its orientation towards 
worker participation quite markedly. Where-
as the unitary v1ewpoint may lead to a 
search lor ways to increase the degree of 
passivity and acquiescence on the part of 
the workforce and trade unions, the plural-
IStic view sees active participation by 
workers in the determination of the condi-
tions affecting their working lives as a 
crucial objective. In turn. each of these 
underlying ideologies may lead to quite 
d1fferent methods and aims, in the pro-
posals of those holding them. towards 
worker participation It may be worth 
examining the implications of these at this 
pomt 
6- -FoJC A Industrial Sociology and lndu•lrl•l Relations, Research Paper NQ 3. Royal Commlulon on Tr•d• 
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Any management accept1ng the real1t1es 
of the pluralist perspective on orgamsatlons 
would see 1ts task not as one of contammg 
and controlling the workforce, but one of 
developing a democratic and pnrticlpatlve 
system of industrial relat1ons. In doing so, 
it would have to come to terms with the 
realisation that for this. the trade union is 
the most suitable vehicle. Ciegg,9 for 
example, argues that the ch1ef scope for 
worker mvolvement In dec1s1on-making lies 
'" the power of the trade union to challenge 
and oppose management. Anything which 
reduces the umon's power to oppose, 
decreases industrial democracy, and hence 
mvolvement '" management decisions 
creates the illus1on of involvement whilst 
reducing the substance 
Pluralists have argued that pressures 
from -below' in the organisation and pres-
sures 'from Without' are increasingly forc-
mg managements to take stock of their 
Situation. Pressures from below arise from 
the demands made upon managements by 
an mcreasmgly self-conscious and articu-
late labour to·rce demanding its rightful 
share of power 1n the enterprise. Pressures 
from without come from the increasing 
pace of change coupled with growing 
government involvement in organisations of 
all types. This has meant that managements 
must look mcreasingly for new and better 
ways of managing wh1ch may necessitate 
changes from established practices. 
Because of these changes, and because of 
changes '" the social climate, workers are 
no longer willmg for management to make 
decisions without justification or consulta-
tion with those whom the decisions are to 
affect. 
Managements w1th a pluralist perspective, 
then , would seek to establish ways m 
which the different mterests of those within 
the organisation could be reconciled. The 
most effective means for this is through 
collective bargaining , where unilateral 
decision-making is abandoned 1n favour of 
JOint regulation This is the essence of what 
McCarthy and Ellis10 term 'management by 
agreement. They suggest that conflicting 
claims upon the organisation can best be 
reconciled if an attempt is made to reach 
agreements with the representatives of the 
workforce In a framework of jointly-agreed 
rules Many managements are reluctant to 
accept the trade union in this participative 
role for two mam reasons. Firstly, they 
see an extension of union involvement as 
a challenge to 'management's right to 
manage,' and secondly, as a threat to 
managerial control. Clearly, any extension 
of !Oint regulation is tantamo.unt to a shar-, 
1ng of power, so in a very real sense 
these fears are well-founded 
The demand from the workforce for 
greater influence m decision-making runs 
counter to management's wish for freedom 
of action We might understand, therefore, 
any moves on management's part to reject 
participatory demands. Nonetheless, as we 
have noted, management have welcomed 
these demands, possibly contrary to our 
expectations. How, then, are these appar-
ently dichotomous views to be reconciled? 
Over the years, demands for participation 
from the shop floor have been mel not with 
attempts to enlarge the role of the trade 
union, but by more direct, task-centred 
methods. Examples of favoured schemes 
mclude job enrichment, JOb enlargement, 
autonomous work groups and joint con-
sultation . The advocacy of such schemes 
may reflect an underlying unitary philoso-
phy whereby management seeks to main-
tain 1ts position of control by making a 
show of appearing to share it. In other 
words, managements favour a plethora of 
schemes which g1ve the illusion of parti-
cipation Without the reality of iL In this 
context, certain forms of 'participation' 
where there IS said to be a sharing of 
control , may in reality be no more than a 
rather sophisticated means whereby 
management maintains the essential fea-
tures of its prerogative intact. Manage-
ment's reluctance to extend the rote of 
the trade union, but its advocacy of other 
schemes for participation, may reflect a 
management belief that these schemes lend 
themselves more easily to regulation by 
management. This would indeed appear to 
be the case since many such schemes 
involve no more than the simple provision 
of information to the workers, or consulta-
tion, where workers do not have the oppor-
tunity to influence decisions. This mode of 
participation may allow some decisions to 
be made, but primarily it concedes only 
decisions of a marginal nature within the 
9--Ciegg H A , op ell 
10-McCarthy W E J , and Ellis N D. M•negement by Agreement (Hutchinson & Co, 1973) 
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I 
constraints of a fr(]mework lard down by 
management 
Faced with r~ tack of commitm~nt tn 
managerral porrcres on the part of the 
workforce management m y attempt to 
engender such commrtment by seemrngly 
offerrng the workfare a share 10 decisions 
On closer examinatrcn, we frequently drs-
cover that the amount of real JOint 
decrsron-makrng power rs considerably 
restrrcted Rarely do rhc e decrsron area<-
lnvolve power-centred decisions such as 
questrons of comp::my strategy cbJectives. 
the drstributron of drvidends and frnancral 
investment. all of wh1ch nonetheless have 
an impact at the shopfloor level on the 
krnds of robs people do 
To d1scuss schemes of worker parttclpa-
tron in the abstract without f1rst examrmng 
the oossible edeologres and obrect1ves 
wh1Ch underprn these schemes ~ a frUit-
less exercrse Hav ng done thrs at some 
length we may now turn to an examrna· 
tron of worker partrcrpation practrces rn 
New Zealand at the present time By exAm~ 
mrng some of the practrcal programmes 
berng used rn New Zealand v1e may be 
able to determrne t'fe degree to which they 
reflect the k•nds ol rdeolog•es oullrned rn 
the ftrst part of t'1rs paper That is we 
may make some assessment of the extent 
to wh•ch these programmes g1ve worker 
A: true share rn decision-making, or alter-
nalrvely seek to act as a persuasrve dev1ce 
in purport•ng to cffer this share without 
actually dorng so 
WORKER PARTICIPATION IN 
NEW ZEALANO 
There s >meth1ng of .hortage of 
published matenal on the ·=tate of worker 
partrc•pat10n rn New Zealand, but a reason-
able rndrcat•on may be gamed from recen' 
,urveys earned out bv the New Zealand 
Department of Labour 11 Early work !nvolv~ 
ed a postal survey m whrch 2,236 employ-
ment unlls employing 20 people or more 
were quest•oned 12 Thrs postal .... urvey was 
confined to lhft manufacturrng •ndustrres 
Of I he 2,027 respondents 253 112 5%) tndt-
cated that they operated some form of 
'worker part1crpatron II is worth notrng 
at thrs stage that the Department of Labour 
requested that the firms classify !herr 
worker partrcrpatron' schemes rnlo one of 
hve ma1or groups defrned as· Autonomous 
(or Semr-Autonomous) Work Groups, Jornt 
Consultatron Profit Shartng, Employee 
Shareholdrng. Jornt Management.1J Only 
one •n e1ght of the firms responding to the 
survey were operatrng some form of scheme 
as def•ned above, and the ma,ority of firms 
operat•ng such scr,emes involved Jornt 
Consultation either by itself or in associa-
tion with another element. More recent 
work by the Department of Labour1 4 exam-
•ned in detail 65 f1rms from the orfgrnal 
nostal survey to ascertain closely the 
detarls of the schemes. Employees were not 
fntervrewed in the study and data concern-
ing employees was therefore provided by 
managements representatives Tne report 
notes that · good industrial relations and 
the des~re to make further rmprovements 
appeared to be central to the reasons for 
rnt 1ducrng worker particrpation throughout 
m("'st of the firms studied''t5 An Instru-
mental v•ew of worker partrcipation may be 
detected at the outset. 
Before embarking upon an examination 
of these schemes of worker participation, a 
brrof comment at this time may be appro-
priate on how such schemes were intro-
duced It rs particularly interesting, in the 
leght of the definition we have used of 
part•crpat1on As JOint decision-making, to 
note that 36 per cent ot the schemes were 
rntroduced without either consultation or 
negotiation wrth the workforce. In other 
words the decision was made unrlaterally 
tv management Similarly. •t rs an interest-
eng comment upon management's view of 
the role of the trade union in worker parti-
CJpatror when we find that 41 per cent 
of the schemes were rntroduced without 
off•c,ally notrfyrng the trade umon, and in 
a further 29 per cent of cases the union 
was •nformed wethout the opportunity to 
consult or negohate.16 
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At this stage we will examine the main 
schemes of worker participation 1n use at 
the present time, according to the Depart-
ment bf Labour's fmdings. We will consider 
these from two viewpomts. Firstly, the 
degree to wh1ch the schemes do 1n fact 
confer some decision-making power upon 
the workforce In order to be termed 
schemes of worker participation, th1s they 
must do at least to some degree. Secondly, 
the kinds of decis1ons 1n which workers are 
allowed to participate. The Department of 
Labour's studies Identified four schemes 
most widely used by firms. These are Jo1nt 
Consultation, Autonomous Work Groups, 
Profit Sharing, and Employee Shareholding 
schemes. 
JOINT CONSULTATION 
Th1s is the name given to a process 
whereby workers' representatives are 
invited to sit on JOint worker-management 
committees to discuss matters of mutual 
concern The purpose of JOint consultation 
is to provide two-way communications be-
tween management and workforce over and 
above that wh1ch takes place informally in 
the normal course of workday events. 
Although the objectives of joint consulta-
tion have never been closely defined by 
Its advocates, It is possible to discern three 
main arguments which are put forward In 
its favour.17 
1 Jomt consultation will enhance the 
achievement of increased producti-
vity by involving the workers. 
through their representatives. in the 
planning and production process: 
2. Joint consultation will provide a 
channel of communication, thereby 
lessening mistrust and suspicion of 
the workers towards management's 
plans and ObJectives, and 
3. Joint consultation will ensure for 
the worker a vo1ce in the manage-
ment of the enterprise. In this way, 
a moral right would be satisfied, and 
Increased co-operation and effici-
ency would result. 
An examination of the limitations of joint 
consultation may help to explain why 11 has 
rarely fulfilled these promises. Perhaps a 
most fundamental point to stress is that 
most joint consultative committees are 
advisory bodies Rarely do they actually 
nave any deciSIOn-making power Their 
function IS to provide a vehicle whereby 
management can collect the views of the 
workforce wh1ch 11 may take mto consider-
ation when making decisions. Furthermore, 
the range of topics which the joint consul-
tative committee IS permitted to discuss 
is also severely limited. Studies of JOint 
consultation show that these topics are 
aenerally of an historical and non-conten-
tiOUS nature 
The s1mple prov1s1on of mformat1on with-
out the power to act upon it, as we have 
argued, does not constitute JOint decision-
making, and hence cannot be said to be a 
participative activity. Moreover, in the ab-
sence of any real power to influence 
events, it is hardly surprising that the 
workforce turns 1ts attention to those areas 
where 11 may be able to influence decisions 
In an effective way, such as collective bar-
gammg In general these criticisms of 
joint consultation are borne out by the 
findings of the Department ol Labour's 
survey· 
"Most representative committees 
played a primarily advisory role and 
had no authority or only limited auth-
ority to make decisions."18 
In summary, joint consultation as out-
lined 1n the discussion above, cannot 
properly be considered a form of worker 
participation 
AUTO NOMOUS WORK GROUPS 
In recent years there has been a growing 
concern with the JOb itself as a source of 
participation in decision-making. A variety 
of different schemes have been proposed 
whereby this might be brought about, 
including such things as job enrichment, 
JOb enlargement and autonomous work 
groups. The term 'autonomous work groups' 
refers to the process of using natural work 
groups, or creating small groups of workers 
to carry out particular tasks. This approach 
involves some delegation of control to wor-
kers, with a corresponding increase in the 
amount of discret1on and decision-making 
1n respect of their particular JObs Such 
delegation does not imply, however, any 
surrender of management's right to deter-
mine the overall objectives of the organisa-
17-Guest 0, and Fatchett 0 Worker Partlclplt'tlon: Individual Control and Performance (I PM 1974) p_ 33 
18-~o~er Plrtlelpatlon In New Zealand· A Study ol Wortc:er Participation In 65 Manufacturing Firms, op. cit 
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lion, and thus the limits which that Implies. 
Although there may be undoubted benefits 
of this approach both to management and 
the workforce. one must question the de-
gree to whtch this is a form of worker 
participation Autonomous work groups 
exercise discretion over a range of deci-
sions, for example in methods of work, allo-
cation of work and the like. However. this 
discretion 1s never open-ended It is always 
exercised wtthin a framework of prescribed 
limits, and these limits are set by manage-
ment. Although exponents of autonomous 
work groups may speak eloquently about 
the humanisation of work and concern for 
employees, It is questionable to what de-
gree these work arrangements stem from a 
concern wtth employees themselves. Rather, 
it is probable that such schemes stem from 
dissatisfaction with diseconomies resulting 
from previous work arrangements, such as 
high levels of turnover and absenteeism 
resulting from boring and repetitive work 
An examination of the Department of 
Labour's findings reveals some doubts over 
the degree to whtch these groups could 
be said to be ·autonomous' tn the true 
sense of the word. Not only is the decision-
making activity constrained severely by the 
degree to whtch management deems tl 
appropnate or useful. but even with1n thts 
framework. management representatives 
may sttll make the final decision. Although 
in most cases "group views were taken into 
account and the supervisor functioned pri-
marily as a leader. tn ntne out of the SIX-
teen cases cited by the Department of 
Labours report, the foreman or supervisor 
had the final say t9 
PROFIT SHARING AND EMPLOYEE 
SHAREHOLDING 
A total of 23 schemes were examtned 1n 
the Department of Labour's survey which 
Involved some form of profit sharing or 
employee shareholdlng in the business. As 
forms of worker parttctpation. these 
schemes may be d1smissed fairly briefly 
Both these types of schemes, rn essence, 
seek to link employee effort to the perform-
ance and well-betng of the enterprise 
Schemes such as these. however, are 
limited to parttctpation tn the prolttability 
of the enterprise and rarely carry with 
them any nght to partictpate 1n decision-
making One might argue that the owner 
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of shares enjoys the right to vote, and even 
to veto company deCISions at shareholders' 
meetings. In reali ty, this is rarely the case, 
and nor do workers usually have sufficient 
shares to make an effecttve impact upon 
the running of the enterprise in this way. 
Moreover, many such schemes are speci-
fically designed to prevent wo rkers from 
gaining a maJOrity shareholdrng 
Schemes of this nature may hold benefits 
for management in giving the workers the 
feeling of greater involvement in the enter-
prrse, even if they do not offer the reality 
of it. In terms of participation in decislon-
maktng, very little mvolvement, tf any, is 
provtded for, and management continues to 
exerctse the power to take decisions unl-
lalerally 
SUMMARY 
I have attempted in this paper to exam-
me the meanmg of worker participation. 
and assess the extent of its application tn 
New Zealand as evidenced by published 
data. Despite a belief that the pluralistic 
view of organrsations represents a more 
realistic perspective, we notice neverthe-
less a marked lack of participative activity 
of the sort we might expect to find tram 
managements holding this frame of refer-
ence. Instead of a move towards Increasing 
the mvolvement of trade unions as a means 
of bringing about joint regulation of the 
enterprise, we find, tf anything, a move In 
the opposite direction. Insofar as it has 
sought to introduce and develop sche mes 
of worker parltcipation, management has 
done so using a variety of o ther means, in 
many cases specifically excluding the trade 
union from any involvement or consultation 
On the other hand, if the unitary view of 
organisations is widespread amongst man-
agement. how are we to account for this 
marked interest in worker participation? 
The answer to this question might be In the 
forms of participation being proposed If 
management could employ a version of 
participation which afforded both an appar-
ent mcrease tn JOtnt decision-maktng 
whilst at the same time allowing manage-
ment to retain control over the key 
dectsion-making areas of the enterprise, we 
might conclude that this would prove an 
Olltracttve course for management to follow. 
On the one hand, management could pay 
ltp service to those demanding a greater 
say in decisions, and on the other, avoid 
having to relmquish any of the key man-
agement prerogatives 
I have argued that th1s is indeed what 
current schemes of worker participation 1n 
New Zealand do. All these schemes, to a 
great degree, reflect an underlying unitary 
philosophy The assumption is made that 
management, by looking long and hard 
enough, can fmd ways to persuade em-
ployees to work together for the common 
good of the enterprise. Attempts are made 
to find ways whereby the employee might 
be persuaded to Identify with management's 
objectives . The concentration is upon task-
centred as opposed to power-centred 
participation. Any move towards power-
centred participation would be a move 
towards changing the present authority 
relationship in the enterprise which a unl-
tar'/ management would seek to oppose. 
An examination of the New Zealand situ-
ation seems to offer little evidence that 
management sees worker participation as 
anything other than a technique. If this 
techn1que is succEssful 1n persuading the 
workforce to work harder, or more pro-
ductively, 1t may be ad;udged a success 
from management's standpoint. That it is 
participation In the true sense of the word 
remains questionable. ® 
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